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Since our last update, covering the period January 3 1 ,1998-February 1,1999, the 
Indonesian military has been center-stage in the country's political transition and 
undergone a host of structural and personnel changes. For this reason we have decided 
to publish our regular update in two parts. This first part will mainly address the 
broad political changes in civil-military relations since Suharto's abdication in May 
1998. In the next issue we will publish a second part focusing on internal institutional 
analysis and a complete data listing on the military elite.
I. Personnel Changes in the Military Elite
Over the past nineteen months there have been far-reaching changes in the 
composition of military elite. From February until October 1999 Gen. Wiranto served 
as both Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in the Habibie government and 
as Commander of ABRI/TNI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Indonesian 
National Military), giving him vast institutional authority over the military as a whole. 
Yet, in the face of political change, the unfolding final crisis in East Timor, and 
escalating regional violence, Wiranto displayed a consistent hesitancy. With the 
exception of the January 1999 reshuffle of Kodam (Komando Daerah Militar, Regional 
Military Command) commanders, he made relatively few high-level personnel changes. 
The officers who served in the military elite during this period were not so much loyal 
to Wiranto as they were indebted to his failure to push through further, and much 
needed, personnel changes.
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The major turning point came in October 1999 with the selection of Abdurrahman 
Wahid as President. A product of political bargaining, his first cabinet included five 
generals: Gen. Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Lieut. Gen. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Minister of Mines and Energy, Lieut. Gen. Agum 
Gumelar as Minister for Transportation, Rear Admiral Freddy Numberi as Minister for 
Administrative Reforms, and Lieut. Gen. (Ret.) Soerjadi Soedirdja as Minister of Home 
Affairs. In a move approved by Gen. Wiranto, Wahid appointed Juwono Sudarsono, 
former Deputy Head of the military's National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) as the 
country's first civilian Minister of Defense since the 1950s and Admiral Widodo Adi 
Sucipto (Class 9 1968) as TNI commander, the first ever non-Army officer to 
command the Indonesian military as a whole.
President Wahid immediately took a series of measures to exert civilian control 
over the military and rein in the Army. First, he instructed the National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM) to investigate military involvement in the atrocities 
committed in East Timor both prior to and after the August 30, 1999 referendum. 
Second, he promised prompt solutions to the regional violence in both the Moluccas 
and Aceh, appointing Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri to handle the former and 
taking personal responsibility for the latter. Third, he also made it clear that he 
supported reform of the military, which was to have important repercussions within 
the officer corps. Taken together, these moves posed a direct threat to the institutional 
interests of the military and the personal interests of senior officers.
Under Wahid's government, there have been four major reshuffles of senior 
personnel. In November 1999, a reshuffle was announced involving more than one 
hundred senior officers. In February 2000 a second reshuffle moved seventy-four senior 
officers. In June another 122 senior officers were transferred. Finally, in August yet 
another, though somewhat smaller, reshuffle was announced. Table 1 (below) shows 
the timing of senior personnel changes.
It is useful to consider the overall impact of these changes since Abdurrahman 
Wahid's selection to the Presidency at three levels: TNI headquarters, Army 
headquarters, and the Kodam command.
With Admiral Widodo's appointment as TNI Commander-in-Chief there has been 
a significant shift of power at TNI headquarters away from the Army, with the Navy 
the primary beneficiary. In partial compensation for the Army's loss of the military's 
top job, Lieut. Gen. Fachrul Razi (Class 10 1970, and an Acehnese) was appointed to 
the post of Deputy TNI Commander, created in mid-1999 and first held by Admiral 
Widodo.1 Overall, however, of the thirteen tops posts in TNI headquarters, eight are 
now held by Army officers, four by Naval officers, and one by the Air Force. It is also 
important to note the graduating classes of these officers. Admiral Widodo and 
military spokesman Air First Marshall Graito Husodo are 1968 graduates; the 
graduating classes of the other three naval officers are not known. The Army officers 
all graduated in 1970, 1971, and 1972.
1 This post was liquidated on September 20,2000.
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Table 1
Timing of Personnel Changes at TNI and Army Headquarters, 
January 1998 -  August 2000
1999 Feb.
TNI Headquarters Army Headquarters
Mar. - -
Apr. - -
May - -
June - -
July - -
Aug. 1 1
Sept. - -
Oct. - -
Nov. 5 2
Dec. 2 1
2000 Jan. 1 _
Feb. - -
Mar. 1 5
Apr. - -
May - -
June 1 6
July - -
Aug.
'
1
At Army headquarters there has been equally great turn-over of personnel. In 
December 1999, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagyo HS (Class 10 1970), who is reputed 
to have strong ties to disgraced Lieut. Gen. Prabowo Subianto,2 was replaced by his 
classmate Gen. Tyasno Sudarto.3 The appointment of Tyasno was followed by a series 
of additional personnel changes in the Army high command, first in November, then in 
March, and again in June. Despite the high turn-over of personnel at Army 
headquarters, over the past three years there has been no real shift in Army leadership 
from more senior to more junior classes. Of the eleven top posts, currently four are held 
by Class 10 1970, four by Class 11 1971, one by Class 12 1972, while two are 
unknown.
2 Subagyo was also haunted by the scandal over his son, Second Lieutenant Agus Isrok, then serving in 
Kopassus, who in August 1999 was arrested in a cheap hotel by the West Jakarta police for heroin 
possession. He was subsequently dismissed from the military and sentenced to eight years in jail.
3 In July 2000, Tyasno was implicated in a Rp. 19.2 billion counterfeit money ring while serving as Head of 
Armed Forces Intelligence Body (served Jan. 41999 - Dec. 21999), the proceeds of which were allegedly 
used to pay the pro-Jakarta paramilitaries in East Timor!
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In the case of Kodam commanders it is useful to adopt a slightly longer time- 
frame, beginning in March 1998, when Gen. Wiranto became ABRI commander-in-chief. 
Seven Pangdam were replaced between March-May 1998 (Kodams I, III, IV, VI, VII, 
VIII, and IX). (See Table 2, below.) In July, less than two months after Suharto's 
abdication, Gen. Wiranto replaced Kodam Jaya (Jakarta) commander Maj. Gen. Sjafrie 
Syamsudin, a Class 14 1974 officer and close associate of Lieut. Gen. Prabowo, with 
Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman (Class 12 1972), and filled his post as Kodam V Brawijaya 
(East Java) commander with Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto (Class 10 1970). All but one of 
the new appointees were members of Classes 10 1970 and 11 1971. The January 1999 
reshuffle included the appointment of four new Pangdams (Kodams I, IV, V, and VI), 
with one from Class 11 1971, two from Class 12 1972, and one from Class 14 1974. 
Following Abdurrahman Wahid's election as President, yet another major reshuffle 
was announced, including the appointment of eight new Pangdam. While the command 
of Kodam Jaya went to Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (Class 14 1974), and that of 
Kodam VII Wirabuana (Sulawesi) to Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah (Class 13 
1973), the remaining six appointments (Kodams I, II, III, VIII and IX) went to older 
officers from Classes 10-12. Finally, between June and August 2000, another seven 
new Kodam commanders were installed; again (with the exception of newly recreated 
Kodam XVI Pattimura in the Moluccas) the appointees were all members of older 
classes—two from Class 10 1970, three from Class 11 1971, and one from Class 12 
1972.
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Table 2
Pangdam Appointments by Graduating Class, January 1998 -  August 2000
I II Jaya III IV  V V I V II VIII IX XVI
1998 Mar.
Apr. 11 
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
1999 Jan. 12 
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov. 10 
Dec.
2000 Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July 11 
Aug.
11
10
11 10 
11 11
12 10
10
12 14 11
10
10 14 11 12 13 12 11
10
11 12
10
10
11
13
In sum, over the past year, the military elite has been monopolized by officers from 
Classes 10 1970, 11 1971, and 12 1972. This is remarkable not simply because these 
officers have dominated the TNI headquarters, Army headquarters, and the 
Pangdamships, but because over the past six months posts have in fact been passed 
from junior to more senior officers. Most observers have argued that the June and July- 
August 2000 reshuffles marked a victory for officers who remain indebted to Suharto, 
who are loyal to ousted Gen. Wiranto, or who simply oppose reform. While this may 
be true of individuals, it is not a compelling explanation for its rapid and wide- 
reaching personnel changes. Rather, the four reshuffles that have taken place between 
November 1999 and the present are best understood in terms of a quite different form
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of internal friction: that between competing classes from the military academy over the 
far more mundane issue of jobs.
The primary divide seems to lie between members of Classes 10 1970-12 1972, on 
the one hand, and Class 13 1973, led by Lieut. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, on the 
other. The members of Classes 10-12 have generally opposed reform because they do 
not want to be replaced and then, invariably, retired from active duty. On the other 
hand, Agus and his classmates have generally supported reform because they are well- 
placed to benefit from it. In other words, the current friction within the military has 
probably less to do with politics and more to do with jobs and career prospects. In 
this light, the November 1999 and February 2000 reshuffles are best seen as benefiting 
officers who graduated from the Military Academy in 1973 and, secondarily, more 
junior classes. By contrast, the June and August 2000 reshuffles mark a victory for 
members of Classes 10 and 11, which now dominate the military (particularly the 
Army) elite. This has disrupted the natural evolution of the military hierarchy and 
stalled the promotion of officers from Classes 13 1973 and 14 1974.
II. Regional Violence
For the Indonesian military, the first real dilemma of the post-Suharto era emerged 
not in Jakarta but two thousand kilometers away in East Timor. In Dili, Suharto's 
resignation was greeted by a flowering of pro-independence protest, with students 
holding a series of free speech fora at the University of East Timor and then carrying 
the dialogues to district cities and towns. In a desperate game of catch-up, politicians 
in Jakarta responded to the situation with talk of a "final solution" to the East Timor 
problem. Already reeling from the loss of eleven officers in a June 6 helicopter crash, 
the military in East Timor was overwhelmed by the outpouring of protest. In August 
1998, in an attempt to appease the population, Gen. Wiranto announced a highly 
public withdrawal of several thousand troops (though Fretilin and foreign observers 
dispute his claim that this withdrawal was actually carried out). Throughout late 1998 
widespread protest continued unabated. Kodam IX Udayana (Nusatenggara), Korem 
164 (East Timor), Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command), 
and East Timorese collaborators like Governor Abilio Soares responded by deploying 
existing paramilitary groups and rapidly organizing new ones.4
On January 27, 2000, President Habibie announced that he would make a final 
offer of "broad autonomy" for East Timor at the next tripartite meeting with Portugal 
and United Nations representatives. Should the proposal for broad autonomy be 
rejected at the UN, Habibie would recommend to the MPR (People's Consultative 
Assembly) to "release" East Timor from Indonesia. With the UN and Portugal refusing 
the offer of broad autonomy, Habibie balked on his plan. Throughout early 1999 
discussions continued at the UN, eventually leading to an agreement for a UN- 
supervised referendum. Although furious at Habibie's offer, the military elite was not
4 For a full account of ABRI and the paramilities in East Timor up until the August 30 referendum, see 
Douglas Kammen, "The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final 
Solution in East Timor," in Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, ed. Benedict Anderson (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, forthcoming).
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completely surprised by the announcement. Many officers had come to believe that the 
government would seek a political solution to the East Timor problem. As bad as the 
pre-referendum violence was, the August 30 referendum and subsequent atrocities 
committed by the TNI and its paramilitaries in East Timor were devastating for the 
military. Internationally, TNI came under immediate and intense condemnation. While 
the nationalist backlash in Indonesia against what was viewed as foreign interference 
and national humiliation was to soften the blow, TNI had suffered a humiliating 
defeat, with repercussions for its political standing at home. When the US called on 
the military to end the violence and punish those responsible, Gen. Wiranto responded 
with the extraordinary comment that he would have to "negotiate" with the boys in 
the field, indicating in no uncertain terms that he and military headquarters were not in 
control of the situation.
East Timor was not the only place where the military found itself facing regional 
violence. In Aceh, two decades of misrule and military atrocities, combined with the 
example of the successful East Timor referendum, fueled support for the Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM) and calls for independence. Unwilling, and 
probably incapable or unable, to respond with a massive military onslaught, and 
reluctant to tarnish its image further, the TNI withdrew a number of battalions in 
August-September 1998.5 In their place, the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) and the Police 
were ordered to secure order in the province, a task for which they were wholly 
unsuited. Finally, after months of negotiation, in May, the TNI took the highly unusual 
step of signing a three-month cease-fire with GAM. However, this move, which was 
intended to undermine support for independence, angered pro-independence 
hardliners and led to an escalation of gangster-style violence in the province.
In Irian Jaya, Suharto's fall was greeted with popular protest and renewed calls for 
the creation of an independent Papua Barat. Chi July 6, 1998, unidentified military 
emits opened fire on one such demonstration in Biak and threw the dead into the sea. 
When some bodies were later washed up on shore, the military claimed that they were 
victims not of the massacre but of the devastating tsunami that hit the coast of Papua 
New Guinea on July 17. A month later, coincident with the highly publicized pull-out 
of troops from East Timor, the military withdrew several Kostrad (Komando Strategis 
Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Command) battalions posted in Irian Jaya as part of 
the Rajawali III operational campaign.6 Nevertheless, the military presence in Papua, 
as the province was renamed, has remained high, with Kopassus personnel posted at 
district-level Kodim headquarters especially conspicuous.
The outbreak of sectarian violence in the Moluccas in early 1999 escalated over the 
course of the next eighteen months. In late 1999 President Wahid assigned Vice 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri to resolve the conflict, primarily because the strong 
showing of her party (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) there in the June 
election demonstrated that Megawati enjoyed support from both Christians and
6 This included territorial infantry battalions 121 (Tebing Tinggi), 122 (Pematang Siantar), 126 (Kisaran),
132 (Bangkinang, Riau), 133 (Padang Panjang), and Kostrad battalions 328 (Bogor) and Armed 10/76  
(Bogor); in November 1999 additional troops from infantry battalions 100 (Langkat), 131 (Payakumbuh),
133 (Padang Panjang), and Kostrad 328 (Bogor) were also withdrawn.
6 These included Kostrad battalions 303 (Garut), 330 (Bandung), 411 (Salatiga), 412 (Purworejo), and 515 
(Tanggul, Jember), as well as territorial Battalion 712 (Manado).
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Muslims. Megawati, however, showed little interest in the Moluccas and the violence 
spread. The TNI, however, responded with an extraordinary troop build-up. There are 
currently at least fifteen different external battalions posted there, comprised of eight 
thousand Army troops and four hundred from the Mobile Brigade. Though sent to 
restore order, it has become clear that a number of these military and police units have 
taken sides, deepening the conflict even further. Finally, President Wahid declared a 
state of Civil Emergency beginning June 27.
There are an increasing number of people, including some in the government, who 
believe that the military is fueling regional violence as part of a broader attempt to 
maintain, or even increase, its socio-political role, and there have been suggestions that 
this is part of a strategy to seize power. There is little evidence to support such a 
conclusion, however, and a host of reasons to think that this is not the case. Rather, 
TNI now finds itself facing (and being implicated in) conflicts that it is militarily 
incapable of winning and from which it is politically unable to extricate itself. The loss 
of East Timor and ongoing violence in Aceh, Irian Jaya, the Moluccas, and now Central 
Sulawesi have stretched the Army's combat units extremely thin. Furthermore, 
members of the military elite have repeatedly denied responsibility for major human 
rights abuses, allowing lower-level officers to take the fall. This cowardice has 
devastated morale among junior and non-commissioned officers, weakened the chain 
of command, and led to increased desertion, both in provinces racked by armed 
conflict and elsewhere.
III. Structural Changes
In May 1999, Minister of Defense Gen. Wiranto announced that there would be a 
phased return to the pre-1980s system of seventeen Kodam, in accordance with the 
"new defense paradigm" designed to ensure that the Kodam are closer to the 
populace. The first such move was taken with the creation of Kodam XVI Pattimura 
(Moluccas) on May 15, 1999.7 There was discussion about when the other six Kodam 
would be established, but no time table was set.8 The primary reason for the return to 
the old system of seventeen Kodam was not that it would enable the military to make 
a better response to local violence nor that the military saw the chance as a means of 
strengthening its political position. Rather, the return to the old system would allow for 
the creation of new posts and hence additional jobs, something badly needed to 
accommodate the bloated size of the officer corps and to offset the loss of jobs caused 
by the abolition of kekaryaan—the secondment of active-duty officers to the civil 
service, local legislatures, and regional executives. Despite the military announcement,
7 The first Pangdam XVI and his successor both held the rank of brigadier-general, not major-general, as in 
the other ten Kodam, reflecting the differential status that had existed prior to Murdani's 1985 
reorganization of the territorial structure and the lower status of the new Kodam.
8 In September 1999 there were also reports that Korem 161 Wirasakti (Kupang) would be upgraded to the 
status of Kodam, presumably to shore up defense along the East Timor and Australian borders, and perhaps 
too as a means of accommodating officers and troops from the defunct Korem 164 Wiradharma (East Timor). 
"Korem 161/Wirasakti NTT Dijadikan Kodam," Media Indonesia, September 29,1999. Note that under the 
pre-1985 system all of Nusatenggara was part of a single Kodam (IX), not two as proposed by Gen.
Wiranto.
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the vociferous local outcry over such plans in Flores and elsewhere makes it highly 
unlikely that the expansion of the Kodam will take place.
Despite these plans, the territorial structure has been affected by two competing 
developments. On the one hand, in accordance with the "territorial doctrine," the 
establishment of new administrative units, particularly Kabupaten, has allowed the 
corresponding creation of new Kodim. On the other hand, in April 2000 the military 
announced the trial abolition of the Babinsa (military presence at the village-level) and 
subdistrict-level Koramil, the lowest rungs of the territorial structure, in Kodam Jaya 
(Jakarta) and in Surabaya under Kodam Brawijaya (East Java).9 Nevertheless, there 
has not been any reporting on actual liquidations; instead, it appears that the Babinsa 
and Koramil have simply been redefined as part of the local Kodim. In sum, over the 
past year there has been both a push for expansion and a pull for reduction in the 
territorial structure. Small as these steps may appear, the resolution of the problem of 
the territorial doctrine and structure is perhaps the single most crucial determinant of 
the future political position of the military.
In May 2000, Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono announced plans to abolish 
the position of TNI Commander-in-Chief (Panglima TNI), and replaced it with a Chief 
of the Joint Staffs (Kasgab—Kepala Staf Gabungan TNI). The new post would no 
longer have ministerial rank, but be placed under the Minister of Defense.10 The TNI 
leadership has also proposed that the position of Kasgab TNI be rotated between the 
three service branches at regular three year intervals, though this proposal remains to 
be discussed with the national legislature. "Rotating the position," according to 
Minister Juwono, "will prevent one service branch from feeling left out."11 Three 
months later, at the August meeting of the MPR, a new bill was passed requiring that 
the selection of a TNI Commander be approved by the People's Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and granting the Vice President the right to play a 
role in military appointments (a crucial decision to which we will return).
After more than a year of discussion, on July 1, 2000, the national police was 
separated from TNI and placed directly under the president's control. Plans were also 
announced to increase its current size of roughly 200,000 to about 300,000, and to 
replace the existing military-style ranks with standard international police ranks, in 
order to improve the police's image. For TNI the separation means a loss of budget, but 
it also allows the military to free itself of some of the least desirable tasks and 
responsibilities, as seen in the handling of Aceh over the past year.
On March 8, in a surprise move, President Wahid signed two new Presidential 
Decrees, one abolishing Bakorstanas, the National Stabilization and Coordination 
Board, the other ending the Special Background Check, Litsus, required of all civil 
servants.12 Though the central secretariat in Jakarta had its own staff, it is necessary to
9 There are, to our knowledge, no Babinsa in either city. Reported in "Proyek Percontohan Komando 
Teritorial," Sena, May-June 2000, p. 62.
10 "Juwono soal Rencana Perombakan Struktur Militer: Panglima TNI Digusur, Diganti Kasgab," ]mva Pos, 
May 23, 2000.
11 "Jabatan Kasgab Digilir Tiap 3 Tahun," Suara Merdeka, June 2, 2000.
12 Bakorstanas was established by Presidential Decree No. 29.1988, replacing the former Kopkamtib. The 
Litsus requirement was enacted by Presidential Decree No. 16/1990.
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note that at the provincial level Bakorstanas was never an independent institution; it 
was primarily staffed by officers from the territorial military commands, with only a 
small number of full-time officers, and essentially served as a "spook" with which to 
threaten repression.13 Litsus has allowed the military to reject the appointment of 
civilians deemed to have "unclean" backgrounds, and hence to justify the continued 
appointments of military personnel to the civil service. Both Minister of Defense 
Juwono Sudarsono and TNI Commander-in-Chief stated that they were not aware that 
there were plans to abolish either Bakorstanas or Litsus, but that they accepted the 
president's decision.
Another surprise in March 2000 was the announcement that Kopassus (Komando 
Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command) would be reduced in size. This 
announcement stirred considerable confusion, apparently initiated by a report in The 
Sydney Morning Herald that Kopassus was to be slashed from six thousand to a mere 
seven hundred troops. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono quickly denied this: 
"That is not true. The truth is that [Kopassus] will be cut from about six thousand 
troops to a little over five thousand, a reduction of seven hundred personnel. It 
wouldn't be possible to reduce personnel from six thousand to seven hundred in only 
one year."14 This signaled an important roll-back of the expansion carried out under 
Prabowo Subianto's tenure as Commander of Kopassus from late 1995 until early 
1998. Yet, a week after the announcement, Kopassus Commander Maj. Gen. Syahrir 
said that he had "not yet received orders" to carry out the reduction.15 Since then, 
there has been no further reporting on this issue and the outcome remains unclear.
At the same time, the military has also announced plans to review the size of 
combat forces in all three service branches and to implement expansions. Over the next 
ten years the Marine Corps will be expanded from its current two brigades (stationed 
in Surabaya and Jakarta) with a total of thirteen thousand personnel to three brigades 
(the third to be based on Rate Island, Lampung) with a total of 23,000 personnel.16 
The Air Force Special Force (Pasukan Khas AU) will be increased from six squadrons 
to ten, with Kupang, West Timor, singled out as the single most important location for 
this expansion.17 And, on a visit to Kostrad Division I headquarters in Cilodong, 
Bogor, President Wahid announced that Kostrad would also be expanded, though no 
details were provided.18 These announcements are in part an attempt to appease the 
military over the changing status of civil-military relations, in part too a matter of 
providing jobs for excess officers.
13 In East Java, for example, the provincial Bakorstanasda was limited to fourteen members, including: 
Pangdam V/Brawijaya, the Chief of Staff of Kasdam V, the regional naval commander (Pangarmatim), the 
provincial chief of police, the Governor, and the provincial-level state prosecutor, with university rectors 
serving as associate members. "Bakorstanasda Dibubarkan, Pangdam V Minta Maaf," Surabaya Post, April 
5,2000. According to one report, the liquidation of Bakorstanas resulted in a loss of jobs for 271 colonels 
and three officers of general rank. "Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan," Media Indonesia, June 11,2000.
14 Quoted in "Personel Kopassus Akan Dirampingkan," Suara Merdeka, March 21,2000.
15 "Danjen belum Dapat Instruksi Pengurangan Anggota Kopassus," Republika, March 31,2000.
16 "Korps Marinir akan Dikembangkan Jadi Tiga Brigade," Republika, December 9,1999.
17 "Pasukan Elit AU Juga Dimekarkan," Riau Post, April 10, 2000.
18 "Presiden akan Mekarkan Kostrad dan Polri," Republika, April 28, 2000.
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The separation of the police, the expansion of combat units, and President 
Wahid's call for a stronger military raised budgetary questions. In December 1999, 
soon after assuming his post as Minister of Defense, Juwono Sudarsono announced a 
62 percent increase in the military budget from Rp. 11.6 trillion to Rp. 18.9 trillion per 
year, with Rp. 9.12 trillion earmarked for equipment and Rp. 5.45 trillion for salaries.19 
Overall, however, it is essential to note that the vast majority of these announced 
changes in the military structure and strength have not yet been implemented and time 
tables have not been made public. Again, it remains to be seen if the military 
leadership is willing to push through reforms that it knows are unpopular with the 
officer corps and troops, and if local commanders will engage in foot-dragging or 
outright resistance to central directives.
IV. Civil-Military Friction
The personnel reshuffles and structural changes discussed above have been 
punctuated by a series of highly public and embarrassing military scandals. These 
scandals have all reflected tensions along two lines: tensions between the president 
and TNI over the redefinition of civil-military relations, and between pro-status quo 
officers from senior military classes and pro-reform officers from more junior classes. 
More interestingly, these scandals have also highlighted a series of institutional 
dilemmas facing the military regarding structural reform, personnel appointments, and 
budgetary constraints.
Soon after being elected President, Wahid invited outspoken Maj. Gen. Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, nephew of former Vice President Umar Wirahadikusumah and a 
1973 graduate of the military academy, to Jakarta for discussions. Taking Wahid's 
selection as president as a sign favorable to further reform and the invitation as 
encouragement, Agus issued repeated calls for the liquidation of the military's 
territorial structure. Senior officers at both TNI and Army headquarters viewed this as 
a challenge to the chain of command and a threat to their authority. Kostrad 
commander Lieut. Gen. Djaja Suparman (Class 12 1972) responded angrily by 
declaring that attacks on the officer corps would anger the military as a whole, 
including troops. Agus shot back: "The soldier's loyalty is to the institution, to the 
nation, and to the state, not to the generals. Our soldiers are not soldiers of hulubalang, 
nor soldiers of generals, and also not hulubalang of the regime."20 The public nature 
and harshness of the extended exchange prompted the TNI commander-in-chief to 
issue a public statement that TNI was not divided: "You [reporters] are the ones 
saying there is a difference of opinion. [But] There's no difference of opinion in TNI."21 
To demonstrate unanimity, Widodo held a commander's call three days later at TNI 
headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, attended by 160 senior officers from all three 
service branches.
19 "Anggaran Militer Naik 62%/' TNI Watch!, December 15,1999.
20 See "Pangdam Wirabuana Tanggapi Pemyataan Pangkostrad: 'Prajurit bukan Hulubalang Jenderal," 
Media Indonesia, December 17,1999. Hulubalang were the "officers" of precolonial Sumatran and Malay 
rulers, mercenaries, raja family members, or local aristocrats, and the term has connotations of feudalism 
and warlordism (i.e. the opposite of professionals).
21 "Laksamana Widodo AS: TNI tidak Pecah," Media Indonesia, December 21,1999.
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Soon after the Agus-Djaja exchange, rumors spread about a planned military coup. 
This rumor not only caused a domestic stir, but also renewed international concern 
about the political position of TNI, with US ambassador to the UN, Richard 
Holbrooke, issuing a warning to the military against such a move. The TNI publication 
Sena ran a front-page article calling the rumor "slander" (fitnah) and quoting military 
spokesman Maj. Gen. Sudradjat as saying: "I think the TNI knows more about the TNI 
than Ambassador Holbrooke. We hope that people outside of Indonesia will not 
meddle in Indonesia's domestic affairs." MPR speaker Amien Rais added that 
"however bad the TNI leaders may be, none of them dare [to attempt a coup]. It 
would be the same as suicide."22 There was no coup, of course. This did not mean that 
military personnel remained united or approved of the ongoing changes, but rather 
reflected the simple fact that the military elite was devoid of forceful leadership and 
deeply aware of its unpopularity. More importantly, the rumor was a clear indication 
that members of the military elite were unhappy with presidential meddling in what 
they viewed as internal matters and displeased by Wahid's open praise for reform- 
minded Agus Wirahadikusumah.
President Wahid responded to the rumors by staging a new series of attacks 
against the military elite. In early 2000, he repeatedly recommended that Wiranto 
resign from his post as Coordinating Minister for Security and Politics and focus his 
attention on the accusations over his responsibility for the East Timor atrocities.23 
Wiranto, however, immediately refused to do so. Stepping up pressure, the president 
suspended Wiranto from his post in early February and appointed Minister of the 
Interior Lieut. Gen. (Ret.) Soerjadi Soedirdja as an interim replacement. Finally, on May 
19 Wiranto was forced to resign. The case highlighted the tensions in developing civil- 
military relations: where Wahid believed that a voluntary resignation would minimize 
resentment by the military, Wiranto's intransigence over three months had the opposite 
affect.
During the same period, President Wahid made repeated public statements about 
there being a coterie of disloyal officers, especially among the Kodam commanders. "I 
know that there are a couple of Pangdam who are gathering forces to undermine 
[mreteli] my government. But I don't care."24 A day later, Wahid suggested that these 
officers had in fact held a meeting: "I could tell you the hotel, the time, who was 
present, and what they discussed. I dare to speak like this because I have proof."25 
Media analysis focused on Kodam V Brawijaya (East Java) commander Maj. Gen. 
Sudi Silalahi (Class 12 1972). But according to sources in TNI headquarters, President 
Wahid's comments were directed at Kodam III Siliwangi (West Java) commander Maj.
22 "Tidak Ada Pikiran TNI Lakukan Kudeta," Sena, January-February 2000, pp. 31-33.
23 In early February, while visiting the Vatican, Wahid offered the fantastic story that Suharto had once 
told ABRI Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung to order Wiranto (then Kostrad commander) to "disappear" 
both Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, but that Wiranto had informed Wahid, who then confronted 
Suharto directly. Reported in "Gus Dur Buka Rahasia Wiranto," Riau Pos, February 7, 2000.
24 The original statement: "Saya tahu kok, beberapa pangdam mengumpulkan kekuatan untuk mreteli 
pemerintahan saya, tapi saya cuek saja." Quoted in "Sejumlah Pangdam Ihgin Goyang Saya "Banjarmasin 
Post, March 15, 2000.
25 "Pangdam Jelek, Out Saja," Banjarmasin Post, March 18,2000.
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Gen. Slamet Supriyadi (Class 11 1971) and Kodam IV Diponegoro (Central Java) 
commander Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo (Class 12 1972).26
In June yet another military scandal emerged. Reports appeared that a group of 
officers had gathered at the home of Lieut. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, located in 
the Senior Army Officers Housing complex in Bulakrantai, South Jakarta, on April 16, 
and once again thereafter. A month later a four-page document began to circulate 
offering an analysis of the forces loyal to Wiranto and Kostrad commander Djaja 
Suparman, and of the ways to accelerate the rise of Agus Wirahadikusumah to the 
post of army chief-of-staff.27 According to sources in TNI headquarters, officers from 
Classes 10 1970-12 1972 politicized what was a regular social event (selamatan) at the 
home of Lieut. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah as being a political meeting and someone 
(perhaps from outside the military) circulated a fake document to discredit Agus. The 
faked document served its purpose: in the June reshuffle Brig. Gen. Saurip was 
removed from his post and plans were made for a further reshuffle later in the year in 
which Agus would lose his post as Kostrad commander.
V. Looking Ahead
Looking ahead, the future role of the TNI will hinge on the resolution of three major 
issues. The first of these has to do with the relationship between the territorial and 
combat structures/units. As discussed above, the doctrine of territoriality, dating from 
the guerrilla struggle against the Dutch, has come under pressure from four different 
directions: (1) reform-minded officers have called for its outright abolition; (2) the 
military elite has announced the trial liquidation of the two lowest rungs (Babinsa and 
Koramil); (3) the military elite has also announced plans to expand the existing eleven 
Kodam to seventeen; and (4) the creation of new administrative units (particularly 
Kabupaten) is allowing the establishment of new parallel military units. Any move to 
alter the territorial structure, particularly reduction, will likely heighten tensions 
between territorial commands and the existing combat commands (Kostrad, Kopassus, 
the Mobile Brigade, etc.). On the one hand, significant alteration in the territorial 
structure will push more officers into the "combat" forces. On the other, primary 
responsibility for social order will also likely shift to these combat units, placing them 
in a more prominent and less enviable political position. Both of these tensions were 
apparent in East Timor in 1998-99, and now also in the Moluccas.
The second major issue concerns the changing character of the Army officer corps. 
The officers now dominating TNI headquarters, Army headquarters, and the eleven 
Pangdamships are all members of the large classes that graduated from the military 
academy during the early 1970s. Their monopolization of senior posts has prevented 
the rise of more junior classes, with Class 13 1973 the primary victim. It thus remains 
to be seen if Class 13 1973 and Class 14 1974 will be given the opportunity to hold 
top posts or, as was the case with Classes 4 1964 and 5 1964, will be bypassed. For
2,7 Both were removed from their posts in July 2000, with Slamet Supriyadi nominated to serve as a DPR 
member and Bibit Waluyo moved to head the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).
27 The document also listed those present, including: Agus himself, Army Assistant for Territorial Affairs 
Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, Kodam Jaya Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Simbolon, Lieut. Col. Baktiman, State Secretary 
Bondan Gunawan, Rahman Tolleng, Prof. Frans Magnis Suseno, and several student and NGO activists.
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beginning in 1976, the size of classes graduating from the Military Academy in 
Magelang dropped (for reasons that remain unclear) to under one hundred per year (a 
75 percent reduction from the four hundred officers per year graduated during the 
early 1970s). These small classes from the late 1970s and early 1980s have already 
achieved a remarkable degree of prominence and appear poised to move into the 
general ranks over the next several years. The political stance and military judgment of 
these officers remains obscure. One imagines, however, given their excellent career 
prospects, that these officers will be politically conservative, preferring almost assured 
career success over political adventurism. But in the face of heightened regional 
violence and economic constraints, these officers may find themselves at odds with the 
troops they command and the local officials with whom they must work.
The third and most important issue facing TNI remains the ongoing struggle to 
redefine civil-military relations. In plain terms, what will civilian supremacy over the 
military mean in a nominally democratic Indonesia? At present there is a great degree 
of confusion over this issue. Although he has not addressed the problem explicitly, 
President Wahid appears to believe that "civilian supremacy" means civilian control 
over not only the policy process, but also of the appointment of military personnel. 
Others have argued persuasively that this view will only upset the orderly 
appointment and promotional process and anger the military as an institution. 
Nurcholis Madjid and others have recommended that civilian supremacy be restricted 
to the policy process, while granting TNI internal autonomy in personnel matters.
Postscript: As we are going to press, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno Sudarto has been 
replaced by Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (Class 11 1971), and Navy Chief of Staff 
Admiral Achmad Sucipto has been replaced by Admiral Indroko Sastrawiryono 
(1971).
